Strategic Use of Corporate Venturing by Möllers, Maximilian Heinrich Gerhard
by
Maximilian Möllers
(242532)
Strategic Use of 
Corporate Venturing
A Case Study Analysis
Diploma Thesis at the
Lehrstuhl Wirtschaftswissenschaften für 
Ingenieure und Naturwissenschaftler
Prof. Dr. Malte Brettel
RWTH Aachen University
Thesis advisor:
Prof. Dr. Malte Brettel
Supervising tutor:
Jasper Masemann
Registration date:   Feb 08th, 2008
Submission date:   May 08th, 2008
Pontstrasse 39
52062 Aachen
I hereby declare that I have created this work completely on my own and used no other
sources or tools than the ones listed, and that I have marked any citations accordingly.
Aachen May 6, 2008
iii
Contents
Abstract xi
U¨berblick xiii
Acknowledgements xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Theoretical Background 3
2.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Corporate Venturing Benefits for an Entrepreneur . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Corporate Venturing Benefits for a Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Strategic Guidelines and Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 A Managerial Decision Framework for Corporate Venturing . . . . . . . 23
iv Contents
2.5.1 Literature-based Evaluation of the Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Survey and Evaluation of the Framework 27
3.1 Research Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Empirical Evaluation of the Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.1 SAP Ventures Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.2 T-Venture Holding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3.3 Vattenfall Ventures Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.4 Volkswagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4 Conclusions 41
4.1 Concluding Evaluation of Miles’ Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Successful Corporate Venturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Matching Objectives and Venturing Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Window on Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Ecosystem Venturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Harvest Venturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Private Equity Venturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.2 Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Contents v
5 Summary and Future Work 51
5.1 Summary and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A Questionnaire 55
Bibliography 69

vii
List of Figures
2.1 Mapping of corporate venture capital investments to a two dimensional
portfolio, from [Chesbrough, 2002] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Success rates for different types of venture units, from [Campbell et al.,
2003] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Potentially appropriate forms of corporate venturing in various corporate
contexts, from [Miles and Covin, 2002] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 U.S. venture capital investments in information technology . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 Wheat prices from 2006 to 2008, from [GodmodeTrader, 2008] . . . . . . 43
A.1 Page 1 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.2 Page 2 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.3 Page 3 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.4 Page 4 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.5 Page 5 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
viii List of Figures
A.6 Page 6 of the questionnaire, English version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.7 Page 1 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.8 Page 2 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.9 Page 3 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.10 Page 4 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.11 Page 5 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.12 Page 6 of the questionnaire, German version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
ix
List of Tables
2.1 Unique Features of Entrepreneurship Terminology, from [Sharma and
Chrisman, 1999] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Corporate Venturing Metrices, ©2005 Research Technology Management 19

xi
Abstract
Strategic cooperations with aspiring start-ups and self-grown, ambitious spin-offs play a
keyrole in a modern innovation strategy. In the last 20 years a lot of different forms of
corporate venturing have been investigated theoretically and especially since the late 90’s
a lot of companies jumped on the bandwagon of venturing. Unfortunately, a lot of com-
panys failed at using this strategic tool despite several theoretical guidelines and so called
best practices from the field.
In this thesis we evaluated one of these guidelines from Miles and Covin [2002] based
on a broad literature review and personal interviews with executives from four corporate
venturing units representing four different industry branches. We come to the conclusion
that Miles’ framework is not the right tool for an executive deciding whether to imple-
ment corporate venturing in his company. Using our interview data, we were able to find
success factors and best practices for corporate venturing. The combination of existing
theoretical knowledge and practical data allowed us to give advice on which corporate
venturing form and organizational structure is the best choice given the company’s ven-
turing objectives. Finally, we state hypotheses suggesting which kind of industry is most
appropriate for specific venturing forms.
xii Abstract
xiii
U¨berblick
Strategische Kooperation mit aufstrebenden Start-Ups und eigengefo¨rderte Spin-offs
spielen eine wesentliche Rolle in einer modernen Innovationsstrategie. In den let-
zten 20 Jahren wurden viele verschiedene Formen des Corporate Venturing theoretisch
beleuchtet und insbesondere seit den spa¨ten 90ern von vielen Firmen in die Tat umge-
setzt. Unglu¨cklicherweise ist ein Großteil dieser Vorhaben fehlgeschlagen, obwohl viele
strategische Rahmenwerke als auch sogenannte Best Practices bekannt waren.
Im Rahmen dieser Diplomarbeit haben wir das Rahmenwerk von Miles and Covin [2002]
basierend auf einer breiten Literaturrecherche und praktischen Daten untersucht. Dazu
haben wir perso¨nliche Interviews mit Fu¨hrungspersonal von vier großen deutschen Cor-
porate Venturing Einheiten aus unterschiedlichen Industrien durchgefu¨hrt. Wir kommen
zum Schluss, dass das Rahmenwerk von Miles nicht geeignet ist das Top-Management
bei der Planung eines Corporate Venturing Vorhabens zu unterstu¨tzen. Dank unserer
Interviews konnten wir danach Erfolgsfaktoren und Best Practices zusammentragen.
Mit Hilfe der vorhandenen theoretischen Erkenntnisse aus der Literatur und den Ein-
blicken in die Corporate Venturing Einheiten haben wir danach sinnvolle Kombination
von Venturingzielen und Venturingformen identifiziert. Abschliessend haben wir Hy-
pothesen aufgestellt, an Hand deren man fu¨r Venturingformen besonders passende Indus-
trien charakterisieren kann. Diese werden wir in der Zukunft mit Hilfe einer quantitativen
Studie endgu¨ltig verifizieren.
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Introduction
Due to dynamic changes internal and external to a company, it becomes more and more
important to permanently adapt strategically and structurally. Stringent objectives, strate-
gies, meaningful innovations, and more than just operative management are a necessity.
Dramatically reducing innovation and product life cycles force companies to invest scarce
resources not only for their current operational costs, but for their future. Especially well-
established corporations have lost their entrepreneurial spirit and lack innovativeness. To
maintain the innovative and competitive advantage a well-thought and well-pursued inno-
vation and investment strategy is more important than ever. Corporate venturing can be a
meaningful part of such an investment strategy.
Direct corporate venture investments help in particalur to form and and to exploit syner-
gies. Typical weaknesses of young companies and grown corporations can be compen-
sated by the strengths of the other one and both companies achieve a win-win situation.
Despite financial reasoning, the value added in terms of “window on technology” through
venture investments is more often the main objective of corporate venturing activities.
Other objectives include market nurturing through investments into the company’s cus-
tomers and a more vivid and innovative business environment, which can bring back the
company’s entrepreneurial spirit.
2 1 Introduction
Although a lot of research has been done in the area of corporate venturing and a lot of
guidelines exist, these guidelines only take few framework conditions into account and
especially the venture’s industry is never considered. This diploma thesis is therefore
exploring the success factors and strategies for corporate venturing in general at first,
followed by a more industry-based view. At first, a strategical framework that advises
certain strategies based on the company’s culture and its venturing objectives is examined
using data from our survey of several German corporate venture units and relevant liter-
ature from the venturing community. Based on these findings, we depict effective ways
of doing corporate venturing, sum up factors that can hamper successful use of corporate
venturing and finally give suggestions on appropriate industries.
1.1 Overview
We first define fundamental terms and give an overview of the current state of research
in Chapter 2 regarding benefits of corporate venturing for an entrepreneur and for the in-
vesting company. Afterwards, existing strategic guidelines and frameworks are presented,
followed by the framework of interest. This framework is evaluated using the existing lit-
erature and an interim result is given. In Chapter 3 the theoretical base of our multiparty
survey and the resulting questionnaire is presented. Our interviews with the corporate
venture unit executives and the implications to the validity of the framework follow. Us-
ing empirical data and findings from current reserach, we then give a final valuation of
the applicability of the framework in Chapter 4 and state success factors, strategies for
corporate venturing and suggestions for adequate industries where corporate venturing
works best.
3Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
“Learn all you can from the mistakes of others. You won’t have time to make them all
yourself.”
–Alfred Sheinwold
In the following sections, we will give an overview of literature from the field of corporate
venturing relevant to this thesis. Potentially relevant literature was identified through a
combination of keyword based searches and manual searches of journals known to publish
articles relevant to the research topic (e.g., Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Journal
of Business Venturing, and Strategic Management Journal). As suggested by [Cooper,
1998], we followed relevant references to older articles and for outstanding articles we
also searched for later articles of the authors, yielding a broad spectrum of literature.
Because general entrepreneurship is more studied, we compare the corporate venturing
process and its participants to the well-understood general venturing process.
4 2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Definitions
Although corporate venturing has been researched since the early 80s the associated terms
are ambiguous. Sharma and Chrisman [1999] therefore took a look at the different term
interpretations and tried to find well-suiting and unambiguous definitions. A lot of authors
have adopted these definitions since then and we are going to do so as well.
Foundation for all other definitions in the domain of corporate venturing are entrepreneur
and entrepreneurship:
• Entrepreneuership encompasses acts of organizational creation, renewal, or inno-
vation that occur within or outside an existing organization
• Entrepreneurs are individuals or groups of individuals, acting independently or as
part of a corporate system, who create new organizations, or instigate renewal or
innvation within an existing organization
Based on these two we now constrain these definitions to obtain further terms.
2.2 Corporate Venturing Benefits for an Entrepreneur
To point out the differences between classic “garage” entrepreneurship and corporate ven-
turing we first take a look at the entrepreneurs.
Greene et al. [1999] presented their studies on the role of the venture champion in cor-
porate venturing. Their understanding of corporate venturing is what we earlier stated
as internal corporate venturing (see Table 2.1), i.e., a venture founded and controlled
by a corporation, which resides within the organizational domain of the corporation.
They define the corporate venture champion as “the individual who is responsible for
2.2 Corporate Venturing Benefits for an Entrepreneur 5
Terms Unique Criteria
Entrepreneurship organizational creation, renewal, or innovation
Independent entrepreneurship organizational creation,
+ by individual(s) not associated with an
existing corporate entity
Corporate entrepreneurship organizational creation,
+ instigated by an existing organizational entity
Corporate venturing organizational creation,
+ instigated by an existing organizational entity
+ treated as new businesses
External corporate venturing organizational creation,
+ instigated by an existing organizational entity
+ treated as new businesses
+ resides outside of an existing organizational domain
Internal corporate venturing organizational creation,
+ instigated by an existing organizational entity
+ treated as new businesses
+ resides within existing organizational domain
Table 2.1: Unique Features of Entrepreneurship Terminology, from [Sharma and Chris-
man, 1999]
the entrepreneurial process of a particular nascent business entity within the organiza-
tion” [Greene et al., 1999]. The role of the venture champion is to identify, assemble and
deploy the corporate’s resources to start the new corporate venture. The venture cham-
pion is seen as a corporate resource. His goals are similar to the ones of an independent
entrepreneur, but he works in a different context and has to behave differently.
Three contextual conditions – time, success hurdles, and boundaries – are helpful to point
out the differences between an independent and a corporate entrepreneur. Corporate ven-
tures take twice as long to reach profitability as do independent [Starr and Macmillan,
1990]. Greene argues that the independent entrepreneur has less financial support and his
own life is at stake. The independent entrepreneur is therefore more focused on reaching
profitability than the venture champion who has better financial support from the corpo-
ration and a monthly paycheck.
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Both entrepreneurs need to sell their businessplan to receive funding, but in case of the
venture champion he will also have to argue for a fit between venture and corporation
strategy [Venkataraman et al., 1992]. The independent entrepreneur does not need to deal
with short term integration or cross-fertilization of the venture and the corporation [Ellis
and Taylor, 1987].´ The third point is the mere existance of structures, policies, man-
agement styles, etc. in the case of corporate venturing. These boundaries can guide the
venture, but it always limits the freedom of the venture champion.
From a resource-based view, Greene lists several differences in the resources that are
available to an independent entrepreneur compared to the venture champion. The differ-
ent kinds of resources are human capital, social capital, organizational capital, physical
capital and as stated earlier financial capital. In the first resource field we see that Typ-
ical, i.e., independent, innovative start-up entrepreneurs are undergraduate students with
a favor for engineering [Roberts, 1991]. However, the typical venture champion will be
on a higher management level, which requires the posession of an MBA. Knight [1989]
supports these statements in his comparison of independent and corporate entrepreneurs.
The independent entrepreneuer has higher technical/industry experience and less evolved
management skills, whereas the corporate entrepreneur has a background of some years
in management, but is lacking latest technical knowledge.
The second resource is the social capital. Especially the social network of an entrepreneur
is important for the venture’s success [Davidsson and Honig, 2003]. The social network
of an independent entrepreneur will mostly be based on his family and friends [Greene
and Brown, 1997]. The venture champion has advantages due to the contacts provided
by the corporation. He gains insight in the corporate capabilities and skills, well-proven
strategies, and can learn from experienced managers in the corporation of ways to deal
with the market [Burgelman, 1984].
As a third resource Greene lists organizational capital that consists of organizational rela-
tionships, organizational members excluding the founder, organizational information and
knowledge as well as combinations of each of these [Tomer, 1987]. During the start-up
process the independent entrepreneur has little to no organizational capital, whereas the
venture champion may be able to obtain organizational capital from the corporation. Cor-
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porations that value change and innovation will be more willing to provide resources to
the venture [Donald F. Kuratko, 1990]. The drawback is that the resources (like person-
nel) may not fit the needs of the ventures, but are taken simply because they are there
[Starr and Macmillan, 1990]. The same is true for the physical capital which Dollinger
[2003] describes as tangible goods needed to operate business and include raw materials,
plant, property, and equipment. Like with organizational capital the venture champion
may be able to obtain resources from the corporate, especially if the venture’s resource
requirements and strategy match the corporate’s [Collis and Montgomery, 1995].
The last kind of resources are financial. These include money, assets, and stocks
[Dollinger, 2003]. Although they are crucial for the venture outcome [Bruno, 1982], they
are limited during the start-up phase. The venture champion has less freedom in choosing
its funding partners, but he is much more likely to get funding – from his corporation.
As we can see, both entrepreneurs face the problem of starting with little resources and
the need for fast growth, due to their personal financial needs or the corporation’s de-
mand. The venture champion is much more likely to obtain support than the independent
entrepreneur, but he will very unlikely have the independent’s freedom of decision.
A more recent study from Maula et al. [2005] about the difference between independent
and corporate venture capitalists presents other facts. Their survey of entrepreneurs states
that independent venture capitalists are strong at raising additional finance, recruiting
key employees, and professionalization of the organization – steps necessary in the very
beginning of the venture. The corporate venture capitalists instead help the venture to
build commercial creditability and capacity, and provide technological support – more
growth-oriented strengths. Their guess is that both sources of advice and support should
be used when possible.
As we can see there is still no clear winner in the game of corporate vs. independent
entrepreneurship. We therefore now take a look at the other side, i.e., the corporation, and
the benefits it receives from supporting a venture.
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2.3 Corporate Venturing Benefits for a Corporation
We saw possible benefits for an entrepreneur to found his start-up with the help of a
corporation. We now take a look at benefits of corporate venturing for the corporation.
As the latest numbers from the European Venture Capital Association indicate, one bene-
fit is high return on investment:
“ Strong 1-year and long-term annualised net returns of 36.1% and 10.8%, respectively,
with top quarter private equity funds returning a hefty 23.3%. Both venture and buyout
produced strong top quarter internal rate of returns (IRR) of 17.4% and 31.0% respec-
tively.” [EVCA, 2006]
Besides these financial benefits, there are several other, more strategic, benefits to receive
with corporate venturing. Winters and Murfin [1988] list a number of benefits and argue
that “acquisition is the most perceived benefit”. Their whole list of benefits is as follows:
• Acquisitions
• Technology licenses
• Product marketing rights
• Window on new technology
• Internal venturing / Intrapreneurship
• Contacts
They argue that investing in a venture fund or venture company may help to identify bet-
ter suiting acquisition targets. The corporation simply examines the ventures during their
start-up process and invests only in ventures promising a synergistic fit. Acquisitions of
really promising ventures unfortunately will not be cheap because professional venture
capitalists want to maximize their return on investment and therefore will not sell shares
at less than fair value.
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Another benefit of contacts to highly innovative startups is to acquire licenses of promis-
ing technology in exchange for venture capital. This can help corporations that are strug-
gling to bring out new and innovative products to compete in their market.
Even if the venture is not willing to license (and maybe lose) its technology it can sell the
marketing rights to the corporation. The venture benefits from the much greater marketing
experience and contacts of the corporation, and the corporation can offer new products to
its customers.
Especially in technology-oriented markets, it makes sense to use corporate venturing as
a window on technology. Winters and Murfin [1988] mention several examples where
the detailed knowledge of venture company activities obtained by involvement in venture
capital has influenced the strategic planning of major corporations.
Another possibility for corporate venturing is to support the founding of ventures from
within the corporation, known as internal (corporate) venturing or intrapreneurship. There
may be people within the corporation that have significant entrepreneurial skills, but have
doubts to leave the company and found the venture on their own.
And finally, due to the mere activity in corporate venturing, the company will get contacts
to “technology-based investment bankers, entrepreneurs, scientists, deal finders and mak-
ers, consultants and the whole network of people who drive the venture capital process”
[Winters and Murfin, 1988]. The corporation gets in touch with the people during their
usual operation, and these contacts may result in businnes opportunities, which would
probably not have emerged in any other way. In a survey by Sykes [1990] this list gets
support. Identification of new business opportunities and development of business rela-
tionships are on top of the corporate venture manager’s list of strategic objectives.
In a later research by Dushnitsky [2004], we see whether these goals could be achieved.
He presents his findings on the limitations to the knowledge transfer from venture to
corporation. He solely observes external venturing used in the “classical” flavor as an
instrument for external knowledge acquisition. His analysis is based on a sample of 258
entrepreneurial ventures and 74 corporate venture capitalists. Using this data he estimates
the probability of an investment relationship between any entrepreneur – corporate ven-
ture capitalist pair. His analysis suggests that “the probability decreases if the [venture’s]
products are potential substitutes and increases when the products of the two are comple-
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mentary” [Dushnitsky, 2004]. The probability decreases even more when the corporate
venturing unit is organized under a tight structure.
He argues that corporate venture capital is a paradoxon: “The actions which aid a firm
to assess and benefit from corporate venturing inhibit an investment relationship with an
innovative venture.” His reasoning is that, e.g., corporations that use corporate venturing
as a window on novel and disrupting technology will unlikely get their hands on this tech-
nology because entrepreneurs often dislike to disclose their intellectual property early on.
Without being able to correctly evaluate the technology, corporations will not invest in the
venture. He concludes that mostly complementary technologies will be acquired throught
corporate venturing.
2.4 Strategic Guidelines and Frameworks
As one of our goals is the search for best practices in corporate venturing it makes sense
to compile the current state of research. We therefore take a look at recommendations
and strategic frameworks on how to implement corporate venturing to fully achieve the
chosen goals.
Winters and Murfin [1988] propose five ways to invest in ventures:
1. Invest in a venture fund as one of several venture partners
2. Establish an own venture capital fund as a subsidiary, that acts like a professional
venture fund, which performs well if you have only financial goals in mind
3. Establish a venture development subsidiary to create new business opportunities
through venture capital investing, technology transfer, or acquisitions
4. Direct investments into ventures without a special entity
5. Internal venturing, where an intrapreneur can utilize corporate technology and re-
sources
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Winters and Murfin [1988] compared several corporations and how successfully they fol-
lowed which of these five strategies. The conclusion is that the corporation has to define
clearly what its financial and/or strategic goals are ([Winters and Murfin, 1988], [Sykes,
1990]). They argue that the main determinants of successful corporate venturing are “or-
ganizational structure, creation of large, quality deal stream, and the involvement of high-
quality people at the venture capital/corporate interface” [Winters and Murfin, 1988].
Although Sykes [1990] only evaluated external venturing they agree with the results.
Their management guideline is to produce a mutually, i.e., supportive environment, where
the interests of both participants are recognized. To improve the relationship the corpora-
tion can:
• Communicate awareness of each other’s specific needs and interests between the
individuals concerned,
• balance the needs of one party with the motivation to fill those needs by the other
party, and
• build a long-term relationship.
Despite the more operative guidelines, like caring for the business partners, Miles and
Covin [2002] proposed a strategical framework that gives strategic guidelines when to
use which kind of venturing. We will skip the introduction of this framework for now. We
will present it in great detail later in section 2.5 to examine its applicability in our survey
in Chapter 3.
Chesbrough [2002] defined a framework for external corporate venturing. His defini-
tion excludes investments made through an external fund managed by a third party. His
framework distinguishes corporate venturing activities along two dimensions – the ven-
turing objectives and the degree to which the corporation and the venture is linked.
One the one hand we have strategic investments: “A company making a strategic invest-
ment seeks to identify and exploit synergies between itself and a new venture” [Ches-
brough, 2002]. On the other hand there are investments with only financial goals. Finally,
the venture can be loosely or tightly linked to the company. All in all this means that
12 2 Theoretical Background
corporation’s venturing activities fall into four different fields (see Figure 2.1).
Corporate
investment
objective
Link to 
operational
capability
tight
loose
strategic financial
Driving
advances strategy
of current business
Enabling
complements strategy
of current business
Emergent
allows exploration of
potential new businesses
Passive
provides financial
returns only
Figure 2.1: Mapping the Corporate Venture Capital Investments, ©2002 Harvard Busi-
ness Review
Chesbrough names the types of investments that are characterized by a strategic rationale
and tight links between start-up and corporation as driving investments. The tight cou-
pling suites these investments to sustain the corporation’s current strategy. Hence, they
will be unlikely to help the corporation to pursue disruptive technologies or to support
new business opportunities that are way beyond the company’s current focus.
Using a more loose coupling Chesbrough comes to enabling investments. One possible
use is to stimulate the development of its ecosystem. The company can invest in its sup-
pliers, customers, or third-party developers to increase the demand of its products. The
drawback is that only companies that have a large market share gain big benefits because
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all competitors will also benefit from the growth of the market.
Even if an investment does currently not have a strategic benefit, it can make sense to
pursue this as long as the investment fits the financial criteria. If it is tightly coupled
Chesbrough uses the term emergent investments. While the immediate benefit is finan-
cial, the ultimate return may result from emerging strategic options. The major danger is
that the company pursues weakly performing investments because it hopes that it eventu-
ally will be of strategic value. One way to achieve financial discipline is to partner with
private venture capital funds. They will not support a bad investment for a longer time.
Finally, Chesbrough comes to loose coupled investments that only have financial goals.
These passive investments are only another option in the traditional stocks and bonds
market and will very unlikely yield strategic returns.
Donahoe et al. [2002] present a study from Bain & Co. They analyzed over 2000 compa-
nies with annual revenues of $ 500 million or more in the United States, Canada, Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Only 14 % of these companies had achieved sustained,
profitable growth over a decade. They defined sustained as real year-by-year revenue
and profitable growth as over 5.5 % less the capital costs. They argue that these high-
performers have a strong (or multiple) core business(es), and only those should think of
capital venturing. The reasoning for this is that, except for some lucky ones, the com-
panies who already had problems with their weak core business were unable to perform
better and only got distracted by their corporate venturing ambitions. They state three
strategies based on a strong core:
• Broaden or deepen the core
• Reinforce the core business by expanding into closely related businesses
• Explore new business models without distracting the core team
These strategies should be employed by the respective teams. This means venture ideas
close to the business’ core should be managed by the new business group and ideas that
constitute to new business opportunities should be managed by the ventures group. Fi-
nally ventures that are supported or even bought for licensing purposes should be con-
trolled by the intellectual property division which often resides close to research and de-
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velopment. For the venture itself the following advice is given: “If the idea is askew to
the core business [..] – or is a defensive move that would cannibalize the core – it’s best
built outside the company to limit distraction, or worse, sabotage” [Donahoe et al., 2002].
Campbell et al. [2003] conducted interviews during 2001 and 2002 with more than 100
executives involved in corporate venturing. They could identify five objectives that were
common among the examined venture units. As we can see in Figure 2.2 the objectives
could not always be reached; they also suggest focussing on one objective. Contrary
to numerous advices from other authors (see [Kanter, 1989], [Mehrdad Baghai, 2000],
[Hamel, 2000], [Richard Leifer, 2000], [Landry, 2001]), their research does not suggest
that incubating a portfolio or promising new venture can lead to the creation of substantial
new businesses and growth.
We now present the objectives in detail and Campbell et. al’s arguments for the different
success rates.
The first presented objective is ecosystem venturing. The company hopes to improve the
vibrancy of its ecosystem by venture capital support to entrepreneurs in the ecosystem.
Campbell et al. argue that this makes sense as long as the business really depends on the
vibrancy of its ecosystem and there is not already great support from other venture cap-
italists. Therefore, this kind of venturing is best applied to very new areas, where other
venture capitalists could not set a foot in.
The most common pitfall for ecosystem venturing is to lose focus. Many interesting busi-
ness plans will be examined by the venturing unit and it is very tempting to support more
promising projects than would be necessary. To avoid this problem, Campbell et al. sug-
gest that the objectives are clearly defined and are strictly followed. This includes the
sectors in which the venturing unit is investing and the relative balance between strategic
and financial value. For the financial aspect, performance measures can be used. Another
idea, that Campbell et al. suggest, is to give existing business units a significant level of
influence over the new venture.
The next objective is innovation venturing. The main purpose is to supplement the cor-
poration’s research and development unit. This venturing form is typically set up as a
separate business unit. The unit should reward people for value created, invest in many
projects to diversify its portfolio and also start joint ventures to reach its goals. Camp-
bell et al. argue that “Innovation venturing is appropriate when an existing function is
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Figure 2.2: The unit was deemed successful or not on the basis of its financial per-
formance, strategic achievements, the comments of the managers interviewed and the
research team, ©2003 MIT Sloan Management Review
underperforming because there is insufficient energy directed toward commercially ori-
ented innovation and creativity” [Campbell et al., 2003]. They also mention the chance
that, given the right conditions like financial support for entrepreneurial projects, man-
agers with entrepreneurial instincts will likely take more risks and invest more energy in
developing new technologies or new ways of working.
The common pitfall in innovation venturing is to see it as an panacea for lack of en-
trepreneurial spirit in the whole company and not just as a tool to improve the effective-
ness of the R&D unit. Campbell et al. suggest that the ventures should be governed by the
R&D unit and managed by a small, senior-level team with its own operating budget. But
it still has to be different enough from the core functions to yield different, i.e. innovative
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and therefore better, technologies and products.
As a third objective Campbell et al. list harvest venturing. The idea is to convert exist-
ing corporate resources into commercial ventures and then into cash. Typical resources
include technology, brands, managerial skills and fixed assets. Harvest venturing makes
most sense when the following three conditions are met. First, there has to be some re-
sources that are not fully exploited. Second, exploitation of these resources must require
the funding of a new business or at least selling or licensing of the resource. Finally, the
resource must not be needed for other business processes.
Although Campbell et al. found some successful use of harvest venturing their research
suggest that “harvest venture units are frequently unsuccesful because they often attempt
to turn spare resources into significant new revenue streams” [Campbell et al., 2003].
Managers often try to surpass the initial goal of just harvesting resources by creating new
growth opportunities – new legs – for the parent company. Unfortunately different man-
agerial skills are required for such an undertaking and the “new leg venturing” idea itself
is flawed as stated earlier. The whole harvest venturing should therefore stick to a very
cash-driven business model and forget about potential growth opportunities.
Private equity venturing is the fourth objective a corporation can aim for. The corporation
invests in startup businesses as it were an independent venture capitalist with the usual fi-
nancial goals. Maula and Murray [2002] found out that the corporate venture capitalists
tend to perform better – a possible reason is that investments by a major corporation lends
creditability to the venture. The conclusion of this would be that every company with a
good corporate brand should perform well doing private equity venturing, but there are
some prerequisites to this as Campbell et al. [2003] argue. The company needs a better
access to a flow of deals than its competing independent venture capitalists. The rare
examples of this situation that Campbell et al. found were companies that were able to
leverage their position in the marketplace or a proprietary technology. In other cases the
companies were hindered by the learning process while entering the private equity market
and could not compete with the experienced independent venture capitalists which only
aim for financial goals.
The main pitfall in private equity venturing is that managers enter markets too late. They
are attracted to successfull markets where the real financial opportunities are already taken
by other venture capitalists. They also excuse supporting poor projects for strategical rea-
sons and stick too long by them. Campbell et al. suggest that in most cases the best bet is
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to stay out of private equity venturing and let others do the business that have the neces-
sary skills and experience. If the company believes it has to do private equity venturing, it
should be set up in a fully separated company with an own closed-end fund with a maxi-
mum investment period of not more than five years. This company should be staffed with
seasoned managers from the private equity industry and be rewarded like by an indepen-
det venture capitalist – based on return on investment of their projects.
The last objective is new leg venturing. Many companies with underperforming core busi-
nesses seek for new growth opportunities not only adjacent to their core, but more widely
using new leg venturing ([Hamel, 2000] and [Markides, 1999]). They think of it as a
low-cost way of experimenting and trying out new businesses. The study by Campbell et
al. does not give any example of a success in this kind of venturing and most companies
have stopped their new leg venturing activities. One has to mention that their criteria for
a successfull venturing unit was very demanding: “We were looking for a unit that had
spawned at least one significant business for the parent company (20% of sales or $ 1
billion in value)” [Campbell et al., 2003]. Campbell et al. give several reasons for this
result. First, if the company is thinking of new leg venturing, its core business is flawed
and the adjacent businesses are not promising – it is already in a bad situation to begin
with. Second, the time it takes to develop a succesfull new venture is longer than the usual
business cycle. This causes managers to quit supporting the venture too early if it is not
successful after a short span. If it is successful or at least promising, it will want to with-
draw resources from the core business, thereby conflicting with other projects. Finally,
early-stage venturing is a tough environment even for professionals that do nothing be-
sides early-stage venturing – “Companies that enter this tough environment without some
advantage cannot expect to beat the odds ” [Campbell et al., 2003]
All in all, Campbell et al. suggest to choose only one form of corporate venturing, state
clear goals, and then follow these strictly. Then there are good chances for a success.
Birkinshaw and Hill [2003] did a survey of 95 corporate venture units to find out whether
behaving like an independent venture capitalist is a good idea for corporate venture cap-
italists. They identified four typical charecteristics for an independent venture capitalists
from the literature:
1. Substantial autonomy over investment decisions
18 2 Theoretical Background
2. The use of high-powered profit-sharing incentives
3. The practice of syndicating investment opportunities
4. Active involvement in the strategic management of portfolio firms
They evaluated the venturing units according to their performance and the presence of
these characteristics. They could not validate their thesis which stated that doing ventur-
ing like independent venture capitalists improves performance: “ Specifically, the highly
autonomous fund structure and equity-based incentives of independent venture capitalists
appear to have low efficacy in corporate venturing environments. [...] Adopting syndi-
cation practices and maintaining high involvement in the venture capitalists community
appear, however, to hold potential for corporate venture units in achieving strategic, in-
vestment management and productivity objectives” [Birkinshaw and Hill, 2003]. Consid-
ering the already mentioned literature, we agree with their suggestion that further research
should distinguish between internal and external venturing and find out which kind bene-
fits more of the independent venture capitalist’s architecture and management style.
Markham et al. [2005] present their work on the role external investments can play in
bringing new technologies into the corporation using direct investing in a company and
participating in venture capital funds. This means they do not consider internal corporate
venturing. Like every other strategy, corporate venturing needs a focussed and coherent
strategy: “A corporation needs to be clear on how it plans to create, capture and deliver
value. Corporate venturing can deliver on all three, but probably not with only one CV
approach.” [Markham et al., 2005]
They do not only list the usual reasons for corporate venturing like technology intelli-
gence, ecosystem development, growth of existing businesses, entering new businesses,
and so on (also mentioned among others by Donahoe et al. [2001] and Fellers [2002]).
They also give tactical advices how to start venturing given the companies principal ob-
jective. This could be:
• Acquiring a window on technology
• Support and growth of the business
2.4 Strategic Guidelines and Frameworks 19
• Exploiting the expertise of (classic) venture capitalists
To actually do corporate venturing, a manifold of design decisions have to be made. To
compare the different designs and their potential outcome, Markham et al. [2005] suggest
several metrices (cf. Table 2.2). These metrices can also be used to compare planned and
actual success.
Consolidated financial – Portfolio internal rate of return
metrices – Number of investments begun
– Number exited
– Capital deployed
Individual investment – Fit with strategic objectives
metrices – Milestones defined and their status
– Cash flow history
– Revised projections for additional investment
– Probability of success
Strategic metrices – Number of contacts between corporate personnel
(outside the CV group) and portfolio company or venture capitalist
– Number of new customer/market/technology
contacts made via investment
– Breadth of portfolio and alignment of portfolio with strategy
Process metrices – Personnel development
– Use of project management tools
– Quality of communications with key stakeholders
– Time necessary to reach investment decisions
Table 2.2: Corporate Venturing Metrices, ©2005 Research Technology Management
With the help of these metrices, managers can plan a corporate venturing program fol-
lowing the checklist from Markham et al. [2005]. This list includes questions regarding
whether to invest internal or external, invest in a fund or company, minority or majority
investment, risk tolerance, exit scenario, organization structure, strategy around intellec-
tual property, incentives for the people involved, and much more.
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At the end Markham et al. [2005] show what they found out in their workshops to be the
major causes of corporate venturing program failure:
• Unrealistic financial expectations on timing and level of returns – inability to realize
venture capitalist-type financial returns
• Inability of purpose and staff
• Failure to align venture’s objectives with parent company, allowing ownership and
control issues to get tangle, and making the wrong alliances
Especially to prevent the last point, it is “important for the two parties to reach agreement
on expectations prior to the start-up getting its money. This is the time when the investing
corporation has the most leverage.” [Markham et al., 2005]
All in all they argue that the main challenge lies in matching the possibilities of corporate
venturing in general with the company’s specific requirements. This is especially true for
the decision whether to directly invest in start-ups or invest in a venture fund.
The already presented literature often listed benefits of a internal or external venturing.
In a paper from Hill and Birkinshaw [2006], the combination of both venturing methods
is discussed. They argue that “ambidextrous” – exploitative and explorative – corporate
venture units do indeed exhibit better strategic performance.
They base their statement on survey data collected from 95 corporate venture units. The
executives of the venture unit where asked to which extent they made use of existing
capabilities of the parent company and to which extent they built new capabilities for the
parent company. Two hypothesis where tested using the survey data :
1. The stronger their relationships between the venture unit and (a) senior executives
in the parent firm, (b) other business units, and (c) the venture capital community,
the higher the level of venturing ambidexterity.
2. The higher the level of venturing ambidexterity (i.e. the interaction of exploitation
and exploration), the higher the strategic performance of the venture unit.
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The test data is proving enough, i.e. the correlation coefficients are significant, to accept
the hypothesises. Combining both hypothesises, they conclude that a high grade of
communication and interaction between the parent firm, other business units, and the
venture capital community improves the overall strategic performance of the venture
unit.
The last work we present in this chapter is from Covin and Miles [2007]. In their article
“Strategic use of corporate venturing”, they describe several models that depict the ways
in which corporate venturing and business strategy coexist as organizational phenomena.
They justify their findings on a study of 15 Swedish, U.K.-, and U.S.-based corporations.
They wanted to identify how companies are venturing in ways or through practices strate-
gic to the parent company. They extracted five models how the business strategy and
corporate venturing are connected in practice:
1. Corporate venturing and business strategy are weakly linked or unrelated
2. Business strategy drives corporate venturing
3. Corporate venturing drives business strategy
4. Corporate venturing and business strategy are reciprocally interdependent
5. Corporate venturing is the business strategy
In the first case, corporate venturing activities and business strategy are largely indepen-
dent phenomena within a corporation, e.g. if the corporation’s venturing activities were
ignored or discouraged by the organization’s top-management. The second possibility is
that business strategy drives corporate venturing activities in a causal unidirectional rela-
tionship. The entrepreneurial activity could be influenced directly or indirectly through
an intermediating variable, such as “organization structure, management style, the firm’s
reward system, [...] or the corporate culture” [Covin and Miles, 2007]. The third possi-
bility is directly the other way round – corporate venturing drives business strategy. This
means, the business strategy could emerge in response to the firm’s autonomous ventur-
ing.
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As a fourth model corporate venturing and business strategy are reciprocally interdepen-
dent, meaning causality flowing in both directions. The business strategy is “opportunis-
tically redefined through the organization’s willingness to acknowledge and encourage
emergent, self-generating innovations [...] Strategy also specifies directions for poten-
tially desirable future innovative activity, identifying domains in which the organization
may achieve competitive advantage” [Covin and Miles, 2007].
A final, more theoretical, model is the case in which corporate venturing is the business
strategy. In contrast to the similar model three (CV drives BS), the corporate venturing
initiatives are those that respond to the innovation suggestions emerging from the firm’s
chosen operating environment. This should result in a more focussed strategy without the
risk of diversifying into unrelated business domains.
During their interviews and workshops they found some “best-practices” many of the
companies followed to strengthen their strategic position, fitting their CV-BS relationship
model. These practices are summarized in their following propositions for successful
strategic use of corporate venturing:
• Set formal corporate venturing objectives
• Recognize the role of corporate venturing in the realization of strategic intent
• Place greater weight on strategic fit or strategic logic than on financial analyses
when evaluating corporate venturing initiatives
• Consciously assess the strategic relevance of corporate venturing initiatives.
• Treat corporate venturing as a learning tool
• Facilitate strategic conversations within your organizations
• Make external corporate venturing investments as complements to internal research
and development (R&D) investments
• Engage in corporate venturing as means for appropriating greater value from your
existing competencies
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• Recognize and exploit the potential of corporate venturing initiatives to create new
competitive games or new market spaces
2.5 A Managerial Decision Framework for Corporate
Venturing
One of the goals of this thesis is to question the strategic framework developed by Miles
and Covin [2002]. We now present this framework and try to evaluate its validity based on
the just presented literature. The purpose of the framework is to suggest the best corporate
venturing form given the corporations characteristics and its corporate venturing objec-
tives. Miles and Covin [2002] developed it based on a field study with multiple extensive
personal interviews and site visits with executives from 11 firms active in corporate ven-
turing.
They classify corporations along three of the dimensions suggested by Jolly and Kayama
[1990]:
• Need for control of venture
• Ability and willingness to commit resources to venturing
• Entrepreneurial risk accepting propensity
The second input parameter for the framework are the corporate venturing objectives.
Miles and Covin picked the three most prominent from their field study:
• Organizational development and cultural change
• Strategic benefits and real option development
• Quick financial returns
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Given these characteristics, the framework suggests one corporate venturing form. Miles
and Covin differentiate corporate venturing along two dimensions. The first being the
origin of the innovation: Internal, e.g. from the R&D department, or external, e.g. a start-
up. The second is the kind of funding: Directly and solely from the company or indirectly
as part of a greater venture fund. This results in four different corporate venture forms:
Direct-internal, direct-external, indirect-internal, indirect-external. All in all, we get the
suggestions as seen in Table 2.3.
Corporate Organizational Strategic Benefits/
Management's Development & Real Option  Quick Financial
Needs & Biases Cultural Change Development Returns
Need for Control of Venture
 - High D-I D-I,D-E D-E
 - Low I-I I-I,I-E I-E
Ability & Willingness to Commit
Resources to Venturing
 - High D-I,I-I D-I,D-E,I-I,I-E D-E,I-E
 - Low I-I I-I,I-E I-E
Entrepreneurial Risk Accepting
Propensity
 - High D-I,I-I D-I,D-E,I-I,I-E D-E,I-E
 - Low None I-I,I-E I-E
D-I: Direct-internal  venturing
D-E: Direct-external venturing
I-I: Indirect-internal venturing
I-E: Indirect-external venturing
Corporate Venturing Objectives
Figure 2.3: Potentially appropriate forms of corporate venturing in various corporate
contexts, ©2002 Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
For example, a company with the need for high control over the venture and the primary
goal of quick financial returns should directly invest in external start-ups.
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2.5.1 Literature-based Evaluation of the Framework
After the introduction of the framework, we are now going to discuss it in light of some of
the related work presented in Chapter 2. The article by Chesbrough [2002] that introduces
a quartering of corporate venturing opportunities clearly falls into the direct-external in-
vestment category of Miles’ framework. His four types of investments can all be found in
Miles’ framework:
Driving investments are comparable to corporations with high control over the venture
and strategic goals, hence the framework’s commendation to use direct-external invest-
ments. For Chesbrough’s enabling investments that also have strategic orientation but a
more loose coupling, the framework suggests a more indirect funding of the venture in-
stead – indirect-external. This makes sense due to the following reason: If the business
is complementary to the current business, i.e. not yet as relevant as the core business,
it is a good idea to limit the venturing’s downside risks by participating in a multiparty
venture fund. The third option is emergent investments. They are also tightly coupled
and primarily have financial goals, but will hopefully achieve strategic relevance. Here
again the framework suggests direct-external investment as Chesbrough does. The last
option is passive investments that have only financial goals and are loosely coupled to the
corporation. Here again Miles suggests the use of indirect-external venturing instead of
direct-external. We agree with him because trying to do “classic” venturing autonomously
without expertise from other venture fund experts, which you would get from participat-
ing in a multiparty venture fund, is very unlikely to yield superior performance – a typical
corporation is not a venture capitalist.
To compare the five main objectives of corporate venturing by Campbell et al. [2003] with
Miles’ objectives, we first try to map each of Campbell et. al’s objectives to the frame-
work and compare the suggested forms of corporate venturing.
Ecosystem venturing clearly falls into the strategic benefits category and due to their sug-
gestions of “giving existing business units a significant level of influence over the unit”
[Campbell et al., 2003] the control over the venture should be high. Consequently, the
framework also suggests direct-internal or direct-external venturing. Although Campbell
et al. suggest not to do new leg venturing at all, they would recommond a direct-external
form of corporate venturing which is one of the options of the framework for real option
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development.
Innovation venturing is similar to the organizational development category. Campbell et
al. suggest that the ventures are governed by the function of wich its business idea is part
of – the R&D department in most of the times. Depending of the needed control over
the venture the framework commends direct-internal or direct-external venturing, just as
Campbell et. al. Private equity venturing is identical to quick financial return in Miles’
framework. Campbell et al. also suggest not to do this kind of venturing at all because
it is very likely to fail in competing with the experienced venture capitalists. If one feels
the need to do it, they suggest a restriction to an external venturing unit that is operated
as a separate unit and behaves like other private equity companies. Miles agrees with the
external view but also offers indirect-external as an option contrary to Campbell’s strict
direct-external approach. We tend to agree with Campbell et al.
The last form – harvest venturing – tries to generate cash from harvesting spare resources
(intellectual property and technology) and has no long term strategic goals whatsoever.
Although the primary goal is to generate cash, i.e. Miles’ “quick financial return” cat-
egory, the ideas obviously come frome inside of the corporation, which contradicts the
framework’s suggestion to use external venturing – a wrong suggestion.
Markham et al. [2005] presents strategies and tactics for external corporate venturing with
primarily strategic objectives. Markham et al. agree with Miles that direct investments
result in a higher control over the venture. They also argue that using direct investments
“risks are higher with concentrated positions in relatively few companies in your portfolio
” [Markham et al., 2005] than diversifying your risks with indirect investments. Conclu-
sively, they agree with Miles’ suggestion to use indirect investments for corporations with
a low entrepreneurial risk accepting propensity.
As we can see the present research does not always agree with the frameworks sugges-
tions. Especially because it is not always unambigous, and few of its suggestions should
maybe be striken off the list. We will skip our final evaluation and improvement sugges-
tions until after the presentation of the survey and its discussion.
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Chapter 3
Survey and Evaluation of the
Framework
“Experience is a hard teacher because she gives the test first, the lesson afterwards.”
–Vernon Saunders Law
In this chapter, we will present the theoretical foundation for our field study, describe the
survey method, report interesting facts from our interviews, and question the applicability
of the strategic framework by [Miles and Covin, 2002] for each company. We will then
conclude this chapter with our thoughts of the framework’s applicability in general.
3.1 Research Method
Edmondson and Mcmanus [2007] compiled the state of research regarding field studies.
They present a framework for assessing and promoting methodological fit as a criterion
for ensuring high quality field research. We map our research onto their framework and
will base our field study on its suggestions.
The framework’s idea is to relate the stage of prior theory to research methods and type
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of data collected. It differentiates between three maturity stages of prior research. Ma-
ture theory “... presents well-developed constructs and models that have been studied
over time with increasing precision by a variety of scholars” [Edmondson and Mcmanus,
2007]. Nascent theory, however, “... proposes tentativ answers to novel questions of how
and why, often merely suggesting new connections among phenomena”. The third to
mention stage is inbetween both and therefor called intermediate theory.
For each maturity stage different methods exist: The less known about a specific topic, the
more open-ended the research questions should be. This requires methods that allow data
collected in the field to strongly shape the researcher’s understanding of the problem at
hand [Barley, 1990]. In contrast, in a more studied area, researchers can use the existing
literature to find spots of interest, and can improve existing models for specific settings
and therefore refine the overall understanding. Here more quantitative methods are the
tool of choice. For intermediate theory it makes sense to test hypothesises, but still be
open to unexpected insights from qualitative data.
As we already showed in Chapter 2, corporate venturing research has evolved out of the
nascent stage, but still there are no detailed, approved connections for successful use of
corporate venturing for each given goal and company. This means our research falls into
intermediate theory.
As [Edmondson and Mcmanus, 2007] suggest, we therefore combine a detailed survey
with personal interviews to have quantitative data on the one hand, but due to open-ended
interviews also new qualitative data.
The interviewees are executives in the venturing department, or subsidiary company of
the corporation of interest. Although IBM, Microsoft, Motorola, and Nokia are acting as
venture capitalists, we did not interview them. They all have subunits stationed in Europe,
but these do not have any strategic competence. These units just scout for new ventures,
arrange contacts, and so forth. Because we need to talk to the executives with strate-
gic competencies and preferred personal interviews, we focussed on corporations that are
based in europe. We restricted the discussions to investments that done by a corporation
after the dotcom crash. This did not affect all industries equally, but we think this gives
more comparable data from different ventures, because around 2000/2001 more invest-
ments were done based on a gutfeeling or industry trend than based on strategic rationale.
As we can see in Figure 3.1, investments in information technology skyrocketed in 1999,
crashed shortly afterwards and over the next years went back to a more stable state.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. venture capital investments in information technology, ©2004 Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers
3.2 Questionnaire
We developed a questionnaire to have a major thread throughout the interview we could
follow. The interviewees got a copy of the following questionnaire and had roughly two
weeks time to prepare themselves for the personal interview, i.e. collect data for the ques-
tionnaire and gather their thoughts on the open questions.
After some introductional chit-chat, interviewer and interviewee went through the ques-
tionnaire and discussed each question and why the interviewee chose a specific box in the
multiple-choice part. Every interesting remark of the interviewee was followed to find out
more about the corporation’s own experience and best practices in corporate venturing.
The whole interview was microphoned so that a more elegant discussion atmosphere was
established and the interviewer could focus on the interview and not its transcription.
The whole interview can be found in Appendix A. Due to the fact that all our interviewees
were Germans, we presented a German version of the questionnaire to them, which is also
available in the appendix.
The interview is seperated into three major parts. In the first part, we ask for the strategic,
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financial, cultural, etc. objectives the corporation tried to achieve by using corporate ven-
turing. In the middle part, we ask how the corporation and especially its venturing unit
is structured and how it tried to achieve these goals. Finally, we ask how well their plans
went and what best practices they could identify.
3.3 Empirical Evaluation of the Framework
We are now going to present the interviews in excerpt and discuss the implications for
the applicability of the framework. We were able to contact and have personal interviews
with:
• SAP Ventures Europe
• T-Venture Holding
• Vattenfall Ventures Europe
• Volkswagen
For each of these companies, we first present the company. Based on our interview, we
present what they wanted to achieve, how the tried to achieve it and finally how well their
strategy went and what lessons they learned. We then characterize the company based on
Miles’ framework, and compare the framework’s suggestions and the company’s success.
Based on the interviewee’s remarks, we give a guess on the utility of corporate venturing
in their industry.
3.3.1 SAP Ventures Europe
SAP Ventures Europe is a purely financial venture capitalists that has the competitive ad-
vantage to have good access to ideas and ventures in SAP’s ecosystem. It was founded
twelve years ago and has grown steadily since then and even survived the burst of the
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dotcom bubble around the year 2000 without greater harm. Its general business plan can
be described as finance-oriented ecosystem venturing. Typically third party developers of
applications based on SAP Software like the NetWeaver platform are supported, but this
is not a necessity - purely financially promising investments are done anyway. Its primary
strategic goal is to have a window on innovation - in this case innovation stands for tech-
nology and new business models. As a typical representative of license based software
contracts, SAP is very interested to have a finger on the pulse of time regarding novel
business models like Software as a Service or Open Source.
On the financial side the primary goal is return on investment. The formal goal is to be
better than the average capital cost, but they were proud to say that their performance is
way better than that. Slow break-even and late exit point are not so much of a problem as
long as they do not interfere with a high return on investment - short term investments of
only some months with a very high return on investment are the preferred kind of invest-
ment but three to seven years until exit are more often the case. Trade sale is the preferred
exit strategy if possible - direct cash is more interesting than to be locked in a deal for
sometime after the initial public offering.
SAP Ventures Europe is the corporate venturing arm of SAP AG and is positioned directly
under the Chief Financial Officer. He demands a specific number of investments per year
and a high return on investment. This high position is backed up by commitment of re-
sources to the venturing unit, top management support, and general acknowledgement by
other business units. SAP Ventures Europe only invests in external ideas and is always in-
vesting with different other venture capitalists. Off-balance-sheet financing is the method
chosen to support the venturing unit.
This general setup allowed SAP Ventures Europe to reach its goals - a high return on
investment and also the window on innovation is wide open. Their idea to strongly focus
on financial goals had success and the SAP AG also has a more vibrant ecosystem on top
of it.
Fitting SAP Ventures Europe into Miles’ framework according to Table 2.3 is straight
forward. Its primary objective is purely financial, it has a low need for control of
venture, is willing to commit resources, and accepts the immanent risks. Based on these
parameters the framework suggest indirect-external venturing opposed to SAP Ventures
Europe being successful with a direct-external approach. If we omit the category “need
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for control of venture”, the framework also suggests the direct-external approach. As
we will show in the other cases, the category “need for control of venture” is always a
problem and we think that a strong control of the venture can destroy its entrepreneurial
spirit. The innovativenes and different thinking often is the main reason for venturing in
the first place and therefor a loose coupling will always be more beneficial than thinking
of the venture as a new R&D unit, which is part of the company.
As we can see, the focus on pure financial goals delivers high financial gains and addition-
ally strategic benefits due to a more vibrant ecosystem. The main reason for this success
is that SAP has a very good market position and its software platform is well suited for
novel ideas from third party software developers. We think that other companies that
have a similar fertile ground would benefit from such an approach - unfortunately not
every company has the standing of SAP.
3.3.2 T-Venture Holding
In 2001 T-Venture Holding was restructured from a pure financial venture capitalist unit
of Deutsche Telekom to a corporate venturing unit. They have a strong focus on strategic
goals, especially a window on technology was the primary ambition for doing corporate
venturing. Although they are also interested in a high return on investment, they under-
stand that growing companies need time to evolve and therefore do not care for a fast
break-even or very early exit points as long as the venture’s evolution is promising and
not to high of a burden for the fund.
They dislike the traditional Initial Public Offering (IPO) exit strategy due to the fact that
in some countries, e.g., USA, one is still bound to the company for the next 180 days.
Their experience is that after these 180 days the stock price will fall again, so one is eager
to sell the shares early on, which presumably is the reason why the stock price falls in
the first place. Another reason is that Deutsche Telekom is listed at the Wall Street and
is therefore obligated to disclose every stock sale. Additionally, they are also an insider
of the venture, therefore they can’t make money out of their inside money and are left as
a minor share holder with no control over the venture and with shares that they can’t sell
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like they wish to. Instead, their preferred exit strategy is a trade-sale. They directly get
money in return and can decide whom they are going to sell the venture, which can be
strategic for the corporation. To get rid of unfortunate ventures the secondary purchase
option is chosen - the shares are sold to a third party fund.
Concerning the cultural goals, the T-Venture Holding is strongly interested in fostering
entrepreneurial spirits inside the company. They organized their venture funds according
to their business units, i.e. one for T-Mobile, one for T-Home, etc. This helps to sup-
port more innovative and creative business units like T-Mobile to be way more active than
more traditional and calm like the conventional telephone network department. For exam-
ple the T-Mobile fund is therefore provided with more money than other less promising
funds.
Summing up their interest, the T-Venture Holding wants to find promising ventures that
have synergies to Telekom’s own business units and it is willing to give the ventures time
to evolve.
To achieve these goals T-Venture Holding founded a hefty fund of C400 Mio. It also gen-
erously commits other resources to its ventures. To avoid destroying the entrepreneurial
spirit in the venture, T-Venture Holding does not require a high control over the venture.
It is instead willing to take entrepreneurial risk in reasonable amount. Based on its big
fund, T-Venture Holding is always funding ventures on its own without any third party
involved in financing. Over 90 percent of its investments are going to external compa-
nies and only 5 percent are spin-offs based on internal ideas. They think this is due to
the fact that, although many good ideas exist inside Deutsche Telekom, most employees
like their egular paychecks more than the risk of being an entrepreneur: “Entrepreneurs
do not work in big companies for a long time” (interviewee). To describe the integration
of the T-Venture Holding in the Deutsche Telekom, it is enough to say that the chief of
the supervisory board of T-Venture Holding is a member of the manangement board of
Deutsche Telekom – Deutsche Telekom is considering corporate venturing as an impor-
tant part of its strategy. The Deutsche Telekom is giving three strict objectives that have
to be achieved. A certain number of investmens has to be done per year and the costs
have to be under control. The last objective is that the number of upward revaluation
of investments has to be higher then the number of downward revaluations – a healthy
portfolio.
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Retrospectively, T-Venture Holding is content with its strategy – although more markets
could have been explored, a lot of market changing technologies have been found and
could be integrated into Deutsche Telekoms business units. They are also satisfied with
the financial performance of their portfolio. Due to the fact that only ventures with a syn-
ergy to the Deutsche Telekom were supported, some financially interesting opportunities
could not be taken. This yields an internal rate of return of the fund which is less than
that of a “classical” venture capitalist, but still a nameworty return in addition to ines-
timable strategic values. They were also pleased with the long-term relationship to the
ventures, because this indicates high synergies between two parties – the reason Deutsche
Telekom started corporate venturing. The preferred point to stop the relation is when the
start-up exceeds its maximum growth. The venture is now grown enough to exist on its
own and also its rate of return turns down. As the last reason for the corporate venturing
offensive T-Venture Holding has to acknowledge that no real corporate-wide change in
the entrepreneurial spirit could be measured. But this may not stay this way. The higher
the hiearchical level of the Deutsche Telekom, the more the people are open-minded for
corporate venturing and innovative thinking in general. Deutsche Telekom recognized
that its old core business, i.e. conventional network telephones, is not the future and then
decided to invest in new promising technologies and business areas. This spirit will po-
tentially sink down to the still more conservative thinking lower hierarchies that are afraid
of novel ways of doing business – “a process of creative destruction” Schumpeter [1942].
A typical problems for a corporate venture capitalist like T-Venture Holding is that it is
hard to get into a deal at first. They argue that there is more money in the venture business
than promising ventures and the competition is high. The proximity to the Deutsche
Telekom can be benificial but also a burden. Taking into account that in some areas only
a small number of consumer exist for mobile devices (Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, etc.)
an investment in such a supplier could lead to conflict of interests. The other way round
it could be interesting for other suppliers to get in contact with T-Mobile to sell their
products exclusively (think of an iPhone – not from apple, but from an unknown startup).
We will now fit T-Venture Holding into Miles’ framework and see whether theoretical
suggestions and practical experience are alike. As we mentioned above, T-Venture Hold-
ing focusses on strategic goals and does not have a high need for control of the venture.
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Referring to Table 2.3, we see the suggestion of an indirect venture form. This contra-
dicts the practice of T-Venture Holding and also does not make sense in this context. An
indirect venturing would not give the close contact that is needed to establish long-term
relationship with the venture. If we take a look at the other rows, i.e. resource commit-
ment and entrepreneurial risk acceptance, we see all forms of venturing as suggestion.
Although this is no contradiction to the practice, this makes the framework not very guid-
ing for managers planning corporate venturing in their company.
Concluding this interview, we see that corporate venturing can be a very valuable strategic
tool. T-Venture Holding set out a clear strategy, commited resources to the ventures, and
the top management supported this strategy. All participants recognized and accepted
the drawbacks of this venturing form, i.e. only small return on investment and no fast
break-even, and they also faced the general entrepreneurial risk.
Especially in the mobile phone industry, corporate venturing should be a good tool to find
new technologies and business ideas. In the days of powerful mobiles and accurate GPS
data, location-based services are one area for future market growth. Some smart ideas
from unknown ventures can have great impact on this fast moving industry and the big
players in the market will need to have an eye on these. The increasing integration of web-
based services and mobile phones opens new markets for fast and innovative companies.
3.3.3 Vattenfall Ventures Europe
Vattenfall Ventures Europe was restructured in 2001 to support Vattenfall’s core business.
It is divided into three units: renewable energies, energy efficiency, and energy services.
One has to mention that reneweble energies were not so important and vivid back then as
they are nowadays. The same is true to an extent for the other two units. They all were
established to explore new markets and see whether they can be beneficial for Vattenfall’s
portfolio.
After two years the management board downsized the venture group because it wanted to
focus on its core business. It beliefs that these non-core business are better handled by
an own internal unit or not at all. They are sure that venture capitalism is not useful in
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the power industry. This resembles the experience and decisions of E.on, RWE, and other
companies in the power industry as stated by the interviewee. He sees corporate venturing
as a more powerful tool for developers of technology and not for users of technologies
like Vattenfall. However, there are still a few investments in Vattenfall’s portfolio but they
are not actively managed by the ventures group and will eventually be sold.
Their corporate venturing offensive was strongly focussed on strategic objectives, espe-
cially the window on technology was very important. The financial goals were not set
and the ventures did not have to achieve high return on investment, fast break-even, or an
early exit point. Instead, it was hoped that an entrepreneurial spirit would be brought into
Vattenfall through the communication with innovative ventures.
The significance of the corporate venturing to Vattenfall’s overal business strategy is eas-
ily described by the venturing unit’s organization. They had C300 Mio. under manage-
ment and the unit’s leading managers are both member of the management board of Vat-
tenfall. The unit typically invested as a minor share holder in external ventures. It had
to do at least three investment in a venture per year. The ventures were financed with
Vattenfall equity.
Due to the fact that the active engagement was stopped after two years the strategic long-
term goals could not be reached. However, the corporate venturing helped in identifying
market changing technologies that were pursued using internal R&D. As already men-
tioned above, some of the funded ventures are still in Vattenfall’s portfolio and give an
average rate of return. The typical exit point for a healthy venture is as soon as the venture
has reached break-even and can live on its own.
Retrospectively, Vattenfall does not value corporate venturing as a useful tool for their
business and technology development because it did not deliver the promised strategic
value. For a company that is developing basic technology, it is a necessity to have early
access to important upcoming technologies or else the company will lose track of the mar-
ket. Instead, as an user of technologies, i.e. a customer of the first-tier developers, there
are other, more secure, ways to observe markets and get the hands on new technologies
(own R&D, acquire grown companies, etc.). These users are therefore not primary users
of corporate venturing. Another point is that it is not typical for a company like Vatten-
fall to have gross amounts of unused intellectual property coming out of the huge R&D
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department (like in a first-tier developer, e.g. Bosch, Siemens, etc.) that should be turned
to value using venturing methods, e.g. create spin-offs.
Due to the fact that Vattenfall’s strategy is alike to T-Venture’s the same is true for the
evaluation of the applicability of Miles’ framework to Vattenfall’s venturing process. The
major difference is that Vattenfall was unsatisfied with its corporate venturing. We think
that the decision to stop the venturing process was quite early after only two years of active
venturing – maybe some of its ventures would have performed well and given significant
benefits to Vattenfall’s overall strategy. However, as we already mentioned above, the
power industry itself may be not the perfect field for corporate venturing. This fact is
completely ignored in Miles’ framework – no hint on what industries are well suited for
corporate venturing.
3.3.4 Volkswagen
Volkswagen founded a corporate venturing division as part of its business development
subsidiary AutoVision GmbH in 2002. The division’s activity has dropped during the last
year due to unsatisfying performance.
The Interviewee states that the main reason was that Volkswagen’s culture is not
entrepreneurial. The support from internal commitees and the top management was
lacking: “The company is used to think in parts list. Not in funded ventures”. Without
top management support and with ignorance or misunderstanding from most deciding
commitees, even good plans will fail. Additionally, the more complex structure of a big
corporation slows down the decision process and will eventually stop it before it’s over.
In small fast reacting “classical” venture capitalists there are less than a tenth of the
people that have to agree to new ventures.
One reason for longer discussions with internal commitees is cannibalism – a venture
could develop a technology that rivals a technology proposed by the own R&D develop-
ment. It sometimes does not make sense for the company to support both technologies.
Therefore, you end up with a promising venture you could invest in and a technology
that you will have 100 percent control over – the venture’s idea must be quite better to
get the support. Another topic is that during economically stressing times where you
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have to think about spending money twice, it is hard to argue for downsizing the R&D
department while investing in risky ventures. The typical reaction is to focus on the core
business and get rid of every non core activity like corporate venturing.
Coming to our survey, the inital goals for corporate venturing were strategic and financial.
On the strategic side only the window on technology was important. Volkswagen thinks
that other tools are better suited to nurture their market – car retailers – or to explore new
markets. Interestingly, the financial objectives, which were implicitly imposed by the de-
ciding commitees, were very challenging. The venture had at most three years time to
break-even, and it had to achieve a high return on investment (20 percent per year for the
whole portfolio). If the venture was generating profits the exit point was not pretermined,
but should be in the range of five or six years. Due to the fact that most of the supported
companies were tier two or tier three suppliers, Volkswagen had less interest in buying
the whole company afterwords as a vertical integration which resulted in trade sale as the
typicial exit strategy. Buyback was included in the venture contracts, but due to the reason
that most of the entrepreneurs money is already invested in the venture, this option was
never used. Although innovative thinking is present at Volkswagen, the entrepreneurial
spirit was missing and corporate venturing should support its introduction.
Regarding the company’s culture, Volkswagen committed numerous financial resources
and even manpower to its venturing unit at the initial stage. Unfortunately, as already
mentioned above, the operative implementation was hampered by hesitant internal com-
mitees and lack of top management support. In addition Volkswagen needed very high
control over the venture – thereby hindering entrepreneurial spirit and flexibility – the
advantage of small ventures over big corporations. Despite the financial support, the risk
acceping propensity was low, which is another reason for problems communicating new
ventures to the deciding commitees.
Volkswagen’s portfolio does not contain any spin-offs and is equally divided into ventures
with 100 percent Volkswagen financing and minor share financing. Although there are lot
of promising ideas present at Volkswagen, no employee was ready to skip his comforting
monthly paycheck and found a spin-off.
As a hard constraint for the venturing unit’s management, two goals were specified. The
first constraint was 20 percent return on investment per year over the whole portfolio.
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Although this is challenging enough even for purely financial venture capitalits, the ven-
turing unit additionally had to present written agreements from adequate departments that
stated the usefulness of the venture to the corporate strategy.
Retrospectively, the initial strategic goal could be met. Every supported (and successful)
venture helped to identify new technologies. One has to remark that often promising ven-
tures had not been supported due to the above mentioned complicated integration process
and could have improved the corporate venturing success. Financially the corporate ven-
turing initiative was way below the high expectations. The profits over the whole portfolio
were marginal and the requested break-even of two years was not reached by any venture.
The exit point for ventures was roughly five years as planned – as long as the venture did
not fail earlier. Although no entrepreneurial spirit could be fostered, the cross-department
activity of the venturing unit helped to communicate problems that existed inbetween dif-
ferent units. One example was the introduction of a document management system which
operates along the supply chain and could vastly improve the communication. This sys-
tem was discovered while searching new ventures, so corporate venturing indirectly im-
proved the corporations internal efficiency.
As a lesson learned, the interviewee argues that it makes sense to focus primarily on one
objective – be it strategic or financial, because corporate venturing is not a panacea that
will give both benefits at the same.
Using Miles’ framework we see ambigous commendations. Volkswagen cleary focussed
on strategic objectives and had a need for control over the venture; this combination re-
sults in a direct-external suggestion by the framework like Volkswagen did. If we take a
look at the other columns of Table 2.3, we see a contradiction: Volkswagen was defini-
tively not accepting entrepreneurial risks – indirect venturing should have been the right
solution. The conclusion is not that the framework is wrong or misleading, but that a de-
cision for high control over the venture implies a close connection to the venture, which
in turn results in a strong connection to the venture’s performance and also failure. This
means that high control plus low risk is not a realistic outcome for corporate venturing
initiatives. Unfortunately, this is not clear at first sight on the framework.
Volkswagen’s decision to reduce their corporate venturing efforts is typical for the auto-
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motive industry. BMW, Porsche, Audi, Daimler, Opel (as part of General Motors) never
had any corporate venturing plans or already stopped their activities. As we argued above,
Volkswagen’s biggest problem was to identify with the risky, fast moving venture world.
Due to the similar size and age of the other companies they probably had similar prob-
lems. Despite the problems with the implementation of a corporate venturing strategy, the
industry itself may not be very suited for corporate venturing. The direct customers are
car retailers that can be taken care of with other strategic in better ways. Directly behind
the car retailers, we have the endcustomer where corporate venturing is not applicable.
On the other side of the supply chain, we have several levels of suppliers, where either
the company is the number one customer, i.e. already can control the supplier and its
technology development, or is one of few big customers, which implies that the supplier
may have a conflict of interest to strongly bound with only one of its customers.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
“Having ideas is like having chessmen moving forward; they may be beaten, but they
may start a winning game.”
–Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
In this chapter, we evaluate Miles’ Framework, give a summary of best corporate ventur-
ing practices, well-suited industries for corpore venturing, and present the successfactors
we were able to idenfity.
4.1 Concluding Evaluation of Miles’ Framework
Without taking a closer look at the framework’s suggestions, it is affected by the wish
to include every possible combination of objectives, culture and environment. Especially
the mapping of a specific company to only two axis has two problems. Not every com-
pany can be clearly mapped, like in the case of Volkswagen, where the need for control
of the venture was high, but risk accepting propensity was low, which resulted in contra-
dicting suggestions. In other cases, the mapping was consistent among the three parallel
axis (control, resource commitment, risk acceptance) but the framework suggested every
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venturing form, which is not helping at all. Another problem with the structure of the
framework is that it allows only zero or one decisions, e.g, high or low need for control
of the venture. We sometimes had problems to fit the venturing initiatives described in
the literature clearly into each category - and surely spent more time with the framework
than an executive would do. Another important dimension that is completely left out is
the company’s industry or at least the structure of its supply chain which vastly affects
the venture’s performance, because as in the case of Volkswagen a strategy like market
nurturing is hard to pursue, whereas Intel is increasing its market nurturing ambitions in
its network chip unit. Also market nurturing is not a good idea if one has low market share
because the competitors will gain more from the investments - this is also completely ig-
nored.
We think that it is very hard to correctly develop such a framework if it is restricted to
only two dimensions and Miles’ did not achieve it. Instead, we will now present our ideas
on successful corporate venturing.
4.2 Successful Corporate Venturing
First of all, we think that corporate venturing has system immanent properties that have
to be accepted or else this strategic tool will fail. As the name suggests corporate ven-
turing is about investing in small growing companies. No matter how careful the ven-
tures area selected, some of these investments will fail. Two years ago, the investment in
forward-looking biogas plants would have been an interesting option, but from todays sit-
uation with tripled wheat prices (cf Figure 4.1) the investment would have been a desaster.
Therefore, a company thinking of corporate venturing has to accept this entrepreneurial
risk or stick to traditional internal R&D or acquire only grown companies.
Another choice offered by Miles’ framework is the extent to which the company needs
control of the venture. Although our case study is comparably small, the companies that
did not oppress the venture performed way better. The advantages of young companies
are their innovativeness and different thinking in contrast to grown corporations. We think
that a strong control over the venture can destroy this entrepreneurial spirit. A loose cou-
pling will always be more beneficial than thinking of the venture as a new R&D unit,
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which is part of the company. All in all, companies should therefore restrain from im-
posing its aged management styles to the young venture. Obviously, it should still offer
support and its knowledge of relevant markets, etc. to the venture and be a guiding men-
tor.
The third corporate context mentioned by Miles’ framework is the ability and willingness
to commit resources to venturing - to take the venturing initiatives serious. As with every
other activity relevant to the strategic planning, it is important that the top management
stands behind the activity and supports it with money, manpower, and guidance. The case
of Volkswagen perfectly backs up this thesis, because the lack of top-management support
and lack of acknowledgement by deciding commitees was the major problem that killed
the venturing initiative. SAP Ventures Europe and T-Venture also back it up because in
these cases top-management support was present and their goals could be achieved. In the
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case of Vattenfall, we could not clearly recognize a very strong or weak support that could
have influenced the withdrawal out of the venturing market. All in all, if the venturing
unit is of strategic value to the company, it needs nameworthy resource commitment to
achieve its goals.
4.2.1 Matching Objectives and Venturing Forms
We will now discuss the different venturing objectives and show our suggestions for fit-
ting venturing forms to achieve given objectives, show what kind of industries are most
suitable for a venturing form / objective combination, and what else needs to be taken
care of.
Window on Technology
Window on technology is one of the top reasons for corporate venturing. One has to differ
between two kinds of window on technology - active and passive. In the first case, the
company is actively searching for a solution for a problem. In the latter case, the company
wants to keep its fingers on the pulse of time. Especially in the latter case external input
and expertise are a necessity, which means that external venturing is the method of choice.
To actively steer the search for new technologies or get the latest innovations, a direct
approach with no financial intermediary is required.
Due to the entrepreneurial risks of direct-external venturing one has to question whether
the gain justifies these risks. Concluding from the related work and our survey we state
our hypothesises.
• H1: Direct-external venturing as a means for a window on technology makes most
sense in industries where the knowledge of this technology yields a sustainable
competitive advantage (cf. Porter [1985]).
• H2: The greater the ratio between
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– development cost plus production cost of the basic technology
– and the value of the technology for the companies in that industry, i.e. ex-
pected sales price,
the greater the gained competitive advantage.
We will now compare these hypothesises with our survey results. Taking a look at western
base technology developers we see that especially for western corporations price compe-
tition is no choice due to high production and labor costs. Instead it is a huge competitive
advantage in a fast moving industry (H2) to be at the bleeding-edge of innovation. Being
one step behind allows the competitors to sell their products and the own market shares
shrinks. There are several german developers of basic technologies that are in the cor-
porate venturing. Bosch founded recently a riskcapital fund of C200 mio to keep track
of new technologies because “technology transfer only with internal R&D and new ideas
from universities is not sufficient” Handelsblatt [2008]. Siemens also has a venture capital
unit since 1999 and has invested C700 million in over 100 startup companies and is still
actively looking for new technologies for their products.
If we take a look at the venturing history of the power industry we see that the four german
key players: E.ON, EnBW, RWE, and Vattenfall experimented with corporate venturing
and had little success and stopped/reduced their initiatives as stated by our interviewee
from Vattenfall.
One could contradict our hypothesis and argue that especially renewable energies are an
example of the fast movement of the power industry and therefore corporate venturing
would be the right choice. We have to disagree because for a company like Vattenfall and
its customers nothing much changes if they build geothermic power plants instead of coal
power plants. Especially because it takes long time to turn the technology into products
and then profits the term “fast moving” does not fit. However a company that actually
develops the base technologies for renewable energies will benefit from new technologies
that, e.g. increase the energy efficiency of their solar cells, because this technology will
directly return a competitive advantage over its competitors, which use less efficent cells.
Although we mainly argued for new technologies that resolve in actual physical products,
our thoughts should be applicable to services as well. Especially new web-based services
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that have small development effort, zero to little production cost but sometimes huge value
for the customer are worth mentioning and therefore interesting venture targets.
For the succesful implementation of any direct venturing approach it is necessary that the
company has at least a small trend towards entrepreneurial thinking to be able to under-
stand the ventures way of thinking - what will happen else can be seen in the case of
Volkswagen. If this basic attitude is apparent, the corporate culture will be drawn even
more towards entrepreneurial and innovative thinking as it had been drawn in every of our
cases. Based on this entrepreneurial culture the company can better support its ventures
and will have greater return on their invested resources.
The corporate venture unit should only support ventures that could yield synergies to the
current core business and competencies. It should not support purely financially inter-
esting ventures or else it will very likely only get deals with less promising ventures and
finally fail at competing with the professionals from the field, i.e. financial VCs.
Ecosystem Venturing
Another common objectives is to stimulate the company’s ecosystem. For example, SAP
succesfully invests in third party developers of software for its NetWeaver platform and
Intel regularly invests in companies that produce network hardware. Both benefit from the
indirect sales growth of their products - more licenses for SAP and more network chips
for Intel.
Obviously this objective requires external venturing; more interesting is the choice of
direct or indirect investment. We think that a direct investment method makes it easier to
control the decision which venture to support. Instead with a financial intermediary other
companies and therefore other interests may be apparent, resulting in less than perfect
venture support decisions.
The whole point of ecosystem venturing is to indirectly increase the company’s sales in
one of the company’s core markets. If the company is not already gaining profits in a
market, it does not make sense to nurture it (exluding possible break-even points due to
economies of scale). It also is a necessity that there are no competitors that will have a
greater benefit of market growth. Because the designated result of ecosystem venturing,
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i.e. sales growth, is primarily financial, it makes sense that the venturing unit is governed
with pure financial goals in mind. For example, SAP Ventures Europe has no strategic
objectives at all. If a financially promising venture can be supported it does not matter
what business it is operating in. However, due to the fact that it is primary searching and
signing investments in SAP’s ecosystem most of its investments will benefit SAP’s license
sales indirectly and also increases the financial performance due to the return on venture
investments. One problem that might occur consists of ventures that endanger the success
of the parent company - hands-off is the right decision.
Regarding matching industries for this venturing form, we think that:
• H3: Direct-external venturing as a means for ecosystem venturing makes most
sense in industries where the ratio between venture investment volume and in-
creased market sales (absolute and shares) is highest.
Harvest Venturing
The third common objective of corporate venturing is to encourage employees of a com-
pany to start spin-offs based on otherwise unused intellectual property - harvest venturing.
Although the idea to turn unused resources into new products and business ideas sounds
promising, we found no evidence of successful intrapreneurship in our cases and other
case studies only found few successful ventures (e.g. [Campbell et al., 2003]). Although
good business ideas may be present, it is hard to find intrapreneurs. Companies that can af-
ford big venturing activities, i.e. do not “miss” several million euro in their balance sheet,
often are somewhat older resulting in more complex bureoucratic structures. Generally
speaking, these companies attract employees that value security of a job over high pay-
ment and freedom to be their own master - the typical reasons not to be an entrepreneur.
“ The ‘cool’ entrepreneurs do not work in such companies, they already started their ven-
ture after college” [Volkswagen interviewee].
However, if entrepreneurial energy is latent in a company, it makes sense to undertake
traditional functional activies like research and development in a “venturing” way. This
venturing activity should be governed by the function it supports, e.g. the R&D depart-
ment. As soon as interesting ideas are identified, internal managers with entrepreneurial
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instincts can be supported to found a new venture. If the company does not have this
kind of manager but is in good contact to external entrepreneurs – maybe due to other
venturing methods – the company can place these ideas in a new venture controlled by
these entrepreneurs and still benefit from synergetic effects.
The main factor for the right venturing form is the reason why the intellectual property or
business idea has not been pursued in the first place. We think that the following items
are the main reasons:
1. Too risky due to low chance on success
2. Too risky due to high investment needed, which may not be present in the current
R&D budget
3. The idea is good but can not be pursued in the current corporate frame
4. The idea is good but does not fit the R&D strategy
In the first case, the idea should be omitted. In the second case, it makes sense to offer
this idea (and if present the intrapreneur) to an external venture fund in order to have
only small risk capital invested and a second opionion, i.e. the fund management, that
has a more objective view on the venture’s chances, thus only accpeting very promising
ventures. The third case should be taken care of with direct funding methods to have better
coupling between corporation and venture thus making it easier to achieve synergies. In
the fourth case the missing fit to the R&D strategy means that the idea is not close to one
of the core businesses and therefore synergies are unlikely. The benefits of investment in
such a venture are purely financial and therefore it should be supported by private equity
venturing methods – see next paragraph for details. The decision which idea gets support
is finally made by the head of the R&D department. It is a good idea to support him with
an expert from the venturing unit, who will be better at estimating the practicability of a
venturing idea.
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Private Equity Venturing
The last option that we will present in our work is private equity venturing. This form of
corporate venturing tries to have a look at as much business plans as possible and support
only the financially very promising plans – it acts like an independent venture capitalist.
It therefore should be setup like its competitors: A separate business unit with experts
from the field and performance-based financial incentives. This venturing unit can only
be successful if they have a better deal flow than other independent venture capitalists.
As we already mentioned above, this venturing form can also be used to turn some of
the, otherwise unused, intellectual property into cash. For external ideas however, it is
argueable whether the overall return of investment less management cost is higher than
the return of an investment in a fund of an full-time private equity company.
4.2.2 Best Practices
Based on the empirical data we presented in Chapter 3.2—“Questionnaire”, we were able
to identify several factors for a successful use of corporate venturing as a strategic tool.
• Top-Management support
• Entrepreneurial culture
• Risk acceptance
• Low need for control over venture by the venture unit
• Clear focus on strategic OR financial goals
• Only one venturing objective
Although the first four points were already discussed in detail in the preceding chapters,
we want to come back to the results of Hill and Birkinshaw [2006] in the light of our
survey. They conclude that a high grade of communication and interaction between the
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parent firm, other business units, and the venture capital community improves the overall
strategic performance of the corporate venture unit.
Although we agree with their findings, one could possibly go one step backward and find
the reasons for strong relatonship among the listed groups, that are the primary reasons for
a succesful corporate venturing use. We assume that the following factors are important
for the intra- and inter-corporational bounds.
First, a companywide acceptance of corporate venturing as a useful strategic tool. As
seen in the case of Volkswagen the absence of the intra-corporational support definitively
hinders corporate venturing efforts. Instead, if the top management stands behind the
corporate venturing efforts and advises the middle management to believe in the ventur-
ing doctrine, the corporate venturing unit will have less resistance in communicating new
ideas and thinking. New ideas from external start-ups can result in new products or busi-
ness ideas and fresh, entrepreneurial thinking inside the company will possibly lead to
spin-offs based on up to now unused intellectual property.
Despite the poorly manageable cultural parameters, the last two points can at least be
planned quite easily. We saw that although the examined venturing initiatives vary a lot
in their goals and respective success, all interviewees agreed with the statement that it
makes sense to focus on only one objective: strategic OR financial. This means that
first, no different venturing objectives should be mixed, because the companies structure
will lack an alignment and the unit’s managers will find themselves pushed in different
directions. This clear focus is also supported by Campbell et al. [2003], who found zero
successive venturing units that had mixed objectives, and a lot of other authors ([Winters
and Murfin, 1988], [Sykes, 1990], [Markham et al., 2005]). The second reason is that
the wish to achieve financial and strategic goals will lead to the excuse of weak financial
performance of a venture with its strategic relevance, resulting in the continued support of
a designated failure. The other way around, one can lose track of the strategic goals while
investing only in seemingly financially interesting short-term investments that might even
conflict with the overall corporate success.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Future Work
“I am not young enough to know everything.”
–Oscar Wilde
In this final chapter we will summarize our research, state the contributions to the corpo-
rate venturing research community, and give an outlook on future research ideas.
5.1 Summary and Contributions
We started with the definition of fundamental terms and presented the current state of
the art in corporate venturing. Afterwards, existing strategic guidelines and frameworks
were presented, followed by the framework from Miles and Covin [2002]. Its evaluation
was one of the main goals of this thesis. It was evaluated using the existing literature
and practical data, which was acquired through several interviews with experts from the
field. For these interviews a theoretical base was established and a questionnaire created.
The interviews with the corporate venture unit executives were done personally at the
company’s location. Based on this empirical data and the existing literature, we came
to the conclusion that Miles’ framework is far from being the perfect tool. Although its
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suggestions sometimes coincide with the companys’ best practices, it leaves too much
room for misguidance and misinterpretation.
Using the acquired knowledge, we have shown four successful ways of doing corporate
venturing:
• Keeping the window on technology open
• Ecosystem venturing
• Harvest venturing
• Private equity venturing
For each long-term goal of venturing, we could identify a suitable venturing form: Direct-
external to keep an eye on new external technologies and for ecosystem venturing, direct-
internal for harvest venturing. In the case of private equity venturing internal and external
venturing can be combined to maximize deal flow and support only the (financially) most
interesting ventures.
Based on the empirical data we were able to identify several factors for a successful use
of corporate venturing as a strategic tool:
• Top-Management support
• Entrepreneurial culture
• Risk acceptance
• Low need for control over venture by the venture unit
• Clear focus on strategic OR financial goals
• Only one venturing objective
We were also able to find characteristica for suitable industries for a venturing form.
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• H1: Direct-external venturing as a means for a window on technology makes most
sense in industries where the knowledge of this technology yields a sustainable
competitive advantage (cf. Porter [1985]).
• H2: The greater the ratio between
– development cost plus production cost of the basic technology and
– the value of the technology for the companies in that industry, i.e. expected
sales price,
the greater the gained competitive advantage.
• H3: Direct-external venturing as a means for ecosystem venturing makes most
sense in industries where the ratio between venture investment volume and in-
creased market sales (absolute and shares) is highest.
Although a quantative analysis with a lot more companies involved is necessary to set
these characteristics in stone, we are confident that such an analysis would support our
findings.
The main benefits of this thesis are:
• The knowledge that two-dimensional frameworks like Miles’ are not capable of
covering all corporate venturing forms and giving meaningful guidance
• An up-to-date overview of the current venturing initiatives of Deutsche Telekom,
SAP, Vattenfall, and Volkswagen
• Success factors for corporate venturing
The contributions to the corporate venturing research community are primarily our find-
ings on most suitable industries for a given venturing form and venturing goal.
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5.2 Future Work
We would like to continue our work in the area of the quadruple:
1. Venturing form
2. Venturing goal
3. Company’s industry
4. Company’s culture
We think that especially the connections to (3) are not fully explored. In this thesis,
we started with some hypotheses regarding industry characteristics and companies doing
direct external venturing as a means for window on technology and ecosystem venturing.
In future work, we would adress a lot more of these companies with very specific and very
short questionnaires to yield quantitative data on our hypothesises. In parallel, we will try
to find more industry characteristics for other internal venturing forms and afterwards
validate with quantitative data similarly.
With these characteristics, an executive can easily categorize its industry and company
and see which kind of venturing is most appropriate. This can reduce the amount of failed
corporate venturing initiatives, increase the number of successfully supported ventures,
and improve the company’s innovation strategy. As a result, the company to gain com-
petitive advantages and not to be trapped between price pressure and the need for more
innovative products.
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Appendix A
Questionnaire
Due to the fact that all our interviewees are native German speakers, we gave them a
German version of the questionnaire. You will find a copy of it after the English version.
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Successful Corporate Venturing
Questionnaire
I want to thank you in the name of Professor Bettel and also
personally for the time spent with answering this questionnaire. I
will send you my research findings as soon as a finish my diploma.
Yours sincerely
Maximilian Mo¨llers
April 1, 2008
Figure A.1: Page 1 of the questionnaire
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Maximilian Mo¨llers
Instructions. This questionaire is the base for the following Interview. Therefore, you do not have to fully
answer all question. Despite the multi-choice part, I would be pleased if you prepare the open-ended questions
with some headwords. This way we can discuss these questions faster.
I would be pleased if you could only include the data and experience from the last six years - roughly
from 2002 on. Do not hesitate to contact me, if you have any questions.
1. Please estimate the importance of the following strategic corporate venturing objectives for your com-
pany.
(a) Strengthen the core business through investments in in(direct) customers (market nurturing).
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
(b) Have an outlook on marketchanging technologies.
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
(c) Explore new markets (spearhead investment).
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
2. Please estimate the importance of the following financial corporate venturing objectives for your com-
pany.
(a) High return on investment
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
(b) Fast break-even
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
(c) Early exit point
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
Figure A.2: Page 2 of the questionnaire
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3. What are your preferred exit strategies and what are their advantages?
4. Please estimate the importance of the following cultural corporate venturing objectives for your company.
(a) Foster entrepreneurial spirit and innovative thinking in the company.
unimportant less important neutral rather
important
very important
5. What other unstated goals are important for your corporate venturing?
6. Please comment on the following statements regarding your corporate culture.
(a) The company is able and willing to commit ressources to the venture.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(b) The company needs a strong control over the venture.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(c) The company is willing to take entrepreneurial risks.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
7. What kinds of corporate venturing does your company use?
(a) Please state an approximate distribution of your investment
% self funded ventures with corporate internal ideas
% self funded ventures with corporate external ideas
% joint funded ventures with corporate internal ideas
% joint funded ventures with corporate external ideas
Figure A.3: Page 3 of the questionnaire
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8. How is your CVC unit embedded in the company (hierarchical level)?
9. Do hard goals exist for your CVC unit (return, number of investments per year)
10. Where do you get the venture capital from ?
How successful where you at reaching your corporate venturing objectives?
11. The following strategical objectives were definitively achieved.
(a) Strengthen the core business through investments in in(direct) customers (market nurturing).
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(b) Have an outlook on marketchanging technologies.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(c) Explore new markets (spearhead investment).
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
12. The following financial objectives were definitively achieved.
(a) High return on investment
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
Figure A.4: Page 4 of the questionnaire
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(b) Fast break-even
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(c) Early exit point
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
13. What is the typical exit point?
14. The following cultural objectives were definitively achieved.
(a) Foster entrepreneurial spirit and innovative thinking in the company.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
15. What are your lessons learned regarding corporate venturing?
(a) Focussing on strategic OR financial goals makes sense.
does not apply
at all
applies less neutral applies more fully applies
(b) If you agreed: On what do you focus and why?
% of the objectives are strategic % of the objectives are financial
Figure A.5: Page 5 of the questionnaire
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(c) If you do not agree: What is the advantage of an integral pursuing of objectives?
(d) What are the typical problems and how could you solve them?
I want to thank you in the name of Professor Bettel and also personally for the time spent with answering
this questionnaire. I will send you my research findings as soon as a finish my diploma.
Yours sincerely
Maximilian Mo¨llers
Figure A.6: Page 6 of the questionnaire
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Erfolgreiches Corporate Venturing
Fragebogen
Ich mo¨chte mich im Namen von Professor Brettel und perso¨nlich
fu¨r Ihren Zeiteinsatz und damit Ihre Unterstu¨tzung meiner Arbeit
herzlich bedanken. Nach dem Abschluss meines Diploms werde ich
Ihnen die Ergebnisse selbstversta¨ndlich zur Verfu¨gung stellen.
Mit freundlichen Gru¨ßen
Maximilian Mo¨llers
January 28, 2008
Figure A.7: Page 1 of the questionnaire
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Hinweise zum Fragebogen.
Dieser Fragebogen dient als Grundlage fu¨r das nachfolgende Interview mit Ihnen. Sie mu¨ssen daher nicht
alle Fragen vollsta¨ndig beantworten. Neben den Ankreuzfragen, wu¨rde ich mich bei allen offenen Fragen
u¨ber Stichpunkte freuen, so dass wir diese ausfu¨hrlicheren Fragen spa¨ter im Interview schneller behandeln
ko¨nnen.
Ich wu¨rde mich sehr freuen, wenn Sie nur Ihre Corporate Venture Ambitionen und Erfahrungen der
letzten fu¨nf bis sechs Jahre miteinbeziehen, also ungefa¨hr ab dem Jahr 2002. Bei eventuellen Unklarheiten
ko¨nnen Sie mich natu¨rlich jederzeit kontaktieren.
1. Bitte scha¨tzen Sie die Wichtigkeit folgender strategischer Ziele des Corporate Venturing fu¨r Ihr Unter-
nehmen ein.
(a) Kerngescha¨ft durch Investitionen in (in)direkte Abnehmer sta¨rken. (market nurturing)
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
(b) Ausblick auf marktvera¨ndernde Technologien behalten.
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
(c) Neue Ma¨rkte erforschen (spearhead investment).
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
2. Bitte scha¨tzen Sie die Wichtigkeit folgender finanzieller Ziele des Corporate Venturing fu¨r Ihr Unterneh-
men ein.
(a) Hoher Return on Investment
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
(b) Schneller Break-Even
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
(c) Fru¨her Exit Zeitpunkt
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
3. Was sind Ihre bevorzugten Exitstrategien und welche Vorteile sehen Sie darin?
Figure A.8: Page 2 of the questionnaire
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4. Bitte scha¨tzen Sie die Wichtigkeit folgender kultureller Ziele des Corporate Venturing fu¨r Ihr Unterneh-
men ein.
(a) Unternehmerisches / innovatives Denken im Unternehmen fo¨rdern.
unwichtig weniger wichtig neutral eher wichtig sehr wichtig
5. Welche weiteren nichtgenannten Ziele halten Sie fu¨r Ihr Corporate Venturing fu¨r wichtig?
6. Bitte nehmen Sie zu folgenden Aussagen bezu¨glich Ihrer Unternehmenskultur Stellung.
(a) Das Unternehmen ist fa¨hig und bereit Ressourcen fu¨r die Ventures zur Verfu¨gung zu stellen.
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(b) Das Unternehmen beno¨tigt eine starke Kontrolle u¨ber das Venture.
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(c) Das Unternehmen ist bereit unternehmerische Risiken einzugehen.
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
7. Welche Formen des Corporate Venturing setzt Ihr Unternehmen ein?
(a) Bitte nennen Sie die ungefa¨hre Verteilung des Gesamtinvestitionsvolumens.
% Ventures mit unternehmenseigener Finanzierung und mit unternehmensinternen Ideen
% Ventures mit unternehmenseigener Finanzierung und mit unternehmensexternen Ideen
% Ventures mit teilfremder Finanzierung und mit unternehmensinternen Ideen
% Ventures mit teilfremder Finanzierung und mit unternehmensexternen Ideen
8. Wie ist Ihre CVC Einheit im Konzern eingebunden (Hierarchieebene)?
Figure A.9: Page 3 of the questionnaire
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9. Gibt es harte Ziele, die Ihre CVC Einheit erreichen muss? (Gewinne, Anzahl an Neugru¨ndungen)
10. Woher wird das Venture Kapital bezogen?
Wie erfolgreich konnten Sie Ihre Ziele bisher verfolgen?
11. Folgende strategische Ziele konnten wirklich erreicht werden.
(a) Kerngescha¨ft durch Investitionen in (in)direkte Abnehmer sta¨rken. (market nurturing)
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(b) Ausblick auf marktvera¨ndernde Technologien behalten.
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(c) Neue Ma¨rkte erforschen (spearhead investment).
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
12. Folgende finanzielle Ziele konnten wirklich erreicht werden.
(a) Hoher Return on Investment
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(b) Schneller Break-Even
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(c) Fru¨her Exit Zeitpunkt
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
Figure A.10: Page 4 of the questionnaire
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13. Was ist der typische Exitzeitpunkt?
14. Folgende Vera¨nderung der Unternehmenskultur konnten wirklich erreicht werden.
(a) Unternehmerisches / innovatives Denken im Unternehmen fo¨rdern.
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
15. Was sind Ihre Lessons Learned im Zusammenhang mit Corporate Venturing?
(a) Eine Fokussierung auf strategische ODER finanzielle Ziele ist sinnvoll
trifft gar nicht
zu
trifft weniger zu neutral trifft eher zu trifft
vollkommen zu
(b) Bei Zustimmung: Worauf fokussieren Sie Ihre Ambitionen und was sind die Vorteile?
% der Ziele sind strategischer Natur % der Ziele sind finanzieller Natur
(c) Bei Ablehnung: Was ist der Vorteil einer ganzheitlichen Zielverfolgung?
Figure A.11: Page 5 of the questionnaire
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(d) Was sind typische Probleme, die Sie feststellen konnten und wie konnten Sie diese bewa¨ltigen?
Ich mo¨chte mich im Namen von Professor Brettel und perso¨nlich fu¨r Ihren Zeiteinsatz und damit Ihre Un-
terstu¨tzung meiner Arbeit herzlich bedanken. Nach dem Abschluss meines Diploms werde ich Ihnen die
Ergebnisse selbstversta¨ndlich zur Verfu¨gung stellen.
Mit freundlichen Gru¨ßen
Maximilian Mo¨llers
Figure A.12: Page 6 of the questionnaire
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